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IDEOLOGICAL
INDEPENDENCE IN
THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL
EXPERIMENT
JOHN S. CONNOR, C.M.*
This nation was founded on assuring its citizenry certain freedoms.
These freedoms were set forth in the Declaration of Independence and in
the Constitution. They sought to assure the populace protection of cer-
tain fundamental rights. It is the premise of this Article that these pro-
tections, while important from a worldly, mortal point of view, failed to
take into account man's primary purpose here on earth-his spirituality.
While important rights were recognized and guaranteed, man's soul was
ignored. "For what does it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, but
suffer the loss of his own soul?"' An apt sub-title for this article would be:
the fallacy of misplaced concreteness.
The American Declaration of Independence (the Declaration) con-
tains a statement concerning human nature as it affects basic political
relationships. Recognizing people's inherent natural rights received from
"their Creator," the Declaration stresses three- "Life, Liberty and the
Pursuit of Happiness."'2 Such innate endowments are considered most
significant when establishing a political system. "That to secure these
Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Pow-
ers from the Consent of the Governed . . . ." The rights thus enumer-
ated evidently characterize humanity's crucial core, according to the Dec-
laration's authors.
4
* LL.B., University of Maryland, Baltimore; M.A., Catholic University of America; M.Div.,
Catholic University of America; B.S., Loyola College, Baltimore.
1 Matthew 16:26.
' See The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
3 Id.
' See M.J. ADLER & W. GORMAN, THE AMERICAN TESTAMENT 37 (1975). Jefferson saw man as
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John C. Murray, the late eminent political theologian, sees the entire
Declaration as comprising "the essential content of the American consen-
sus . . . ." According to Murray, "the whole consensus has its ultimate
root in the idea of the sacredness of man res sacra homo. Man has a
sacredness of personal dignity .. .. "0 What Murray says on the latter
count undoubtedly is true, elementally anyway. Human nature does pos-
sess sacred or divine-like capacities. When those exalting potentials be-
come encapsulated in the typical concepts which the Declaration utilizes,
though, they theoretically distort humanity's vital dynamism. The result-
ing expression exhibits the fallacy of misplaced concreteness and conse-
quently indicates a fundamental outlook that fosters certain serious polit-
ical problems.
BASIC HUMAN DYNAMICS
Modern psychology affords instructive insights regarding the central
human dynamic. Psychoanalysis discerns a primordial covert dynamism
galvanizing the individual subject. Each person's innate developmental
inclinations originate there. Thence spring the forces fomenting growth,
so promoting self-realization or fulfillment. Jung classified this realm as
the "unconscious." '7 Freud observed the same impelling source, terming it
the "id." At the opposite dynamic extremity, both analysts distinguish
another division of the human personality. Such sector entails overt oper-
ating mechanisms enabling the agent to contact, and interact with his or
her environment. It includes varied practical procedures, reflecting an ul-
possessing freedom of choice and as having an obligation to pursue this freedom "to fulfill
himself as a man." Id. at 37-38.
To implement the discharge of these obligations, a man must have the right to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness: the right to life being his right to security
against forces or factors inimical to its preservation; the right to liberty being his
right to conditions or circumstances favoring or facilitating the carrying out in action
of the choices he makes; and the right to the pursuit of happiness being his right to
whatever help organized society can give him in his effort to make a good human life
for himself.
Id. at 38; see also F. DONOVAN, MR. JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION 138-42 (1968) (life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness viewed by Jefferson as inherent and fundamental rights of man).
' J.C. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 28 (1960).
' Id. at 81.
7 THE BASIC WRITINGS OF C.G. JUNG 56, 107-08, 154, 282-85, 503-04 (V. de Lazlo ed. 1959)
[hereinafter cited as BASIC WRITINGS OF JUNG]; see also MAN AND His SYMBOLS 23 (C. Jung
& M. Von Franz eds. 1964). Concerning the existence of the unconscious Jung stated: "Who-
ever denies the existence of the unconscious is in fact assuming that our present knowledge
of the psyche is total. And this belief is clearly just as false as the assumption that we know
all there is to be known about the natural universe." Id.
a 19 PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 19-27 (J. Strachez ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF FREUD].
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timate functional capacity for expressly giving and receiving. Being most
specific or detailed, hence heavily sensibly weighted, they ordinarily make
very vivid impressions upon their possessors. Jung and Freud each named
that consumingly conscious and mobile vital area the "ego."
9
These same psychological specialists detect an additional, somewhat
mediate, crucial personal zone. Standards controlling usage of the differ-
ent organs and faculties spawning and supporting the essential exigencies
prevail here. Those comparatively central components, providing a real
living or balancing link between the foregoing contrasting tendencies, ex-
ert a consolidating influence which correspondingly structures or forms
the subject, individually and socially. Jung saw it as the "semi-conscious"
sphere, in which the spiritual-corporeal, soul and body, principally ad-
here. Freud designated a similar semi-conscious, but strictly corporeal,
formative category as the "super-ego." 1
Thus the decisively discernible subjective states, taken together,
comprise the total human self or personality, in its elementary dynamic
outlines. Karl Rahner, from the theological viewpoint, confirms the exis-
tence of such critical vital capacities. He finds the "seminal person" to be
a continuing dimension of the one person, fulfilled in the "achieved per-
son," via the "intermediary reality of the person."" Each basic character-
istic is interpreted developmentally or historically, as complementary
contributory constants, not simply total lifetime periods. They are mea-
sured before the Christian revelation's supernaturally-lighted cosmic
"screen," and unmistakably show the "Trinitarian trace," or image. Cor-
rectly concertedly construed, and employed, their interlocked guiding
(cognitive) and guarding (affective) impact represents the divine dyna-
mism's creative impress-as final, formal, and functional causes.
All three essentially coherent and cohesive, created personalized sec-
tors accordingly carry equal vital value. They therefore deserve a propor-
tionately balanced (due priorities), progressively conscious, or humanly-
becoming recognition and respect. Envisioned as more proximate, hence
better manageable and usable, succinct conditions, these critical substan-
tive relationships are rightly seen as consecutively concerned with cre-
ations-central dynamic components-ends, means, and methods.
Whether we know it or not, it is under these stimulating and synchro-
nizing influences that we constantly, if often inconsistently, seek satisfac-
tion amid our manifestly multiple and complex engagements. This funda-
mental fact might be easier perceived when one recalls the persistently
I BASIC WRITINGS OF JUNG, supra note 7, at 54-60, 246-47; PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF FREUD,
supra note 8, at 24-27.
" PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF FREUD, supra note 8, at 11, 28-39.
" See 2 K. RAHNER, THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 272-74 (1963).
12 See 1 T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Q45, art.7 (Trinity embodied in every creature).
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perplexing factors that basically affect our efforts along those searching
lines. Having a predominantly spiritual-substantial, theoretical-philo-
sophical significance, they require penetrating insight, and a readiness to
probe beneath their largely corporeal-supplemental, practical-historical
counterparts.
In his divinely-human role, Christ implicitly affirmed the aforesaid
natural, human dynamic divisions. He summarized the meaning of the
entire messianic mission by describing Himself as "the way, the truth,
and the life."13 Affording humanity eternal life reflects the end or purpose
of His mediating presence. 14 Accepting the cross, entailing self-denial and
other-avowal, or seeking and serving "the kingdom of God and His holi-
ness" 5 through one's social situation, represents the methods of promot-
ing such life. Linking these two essential exigencies as the crucial consoli-
dating, and controlling constituent, we have the means-truth that mainly
makes the saving process effective for humans. This is the case consonant
with their cosmic mediating status, as the middle creaturely class, be-
tween the angelical and physical-biological types.'6
Like its central connecting contribution to the fundamental dyna-
mism of human nature, truth also has a similar conjunctive element in
itself. The import thereof was emphasized by Christ initially, and inchoa-
tively, when announcing His teaching theme-"Repent, for the kingdom
of Heaven is at hand."'" Correcting the deadly formal or structural disor-
der which long had impaired proper human development, Christ com-
bined the theoretical principle and practical trait chiefly supporting eve-
rything else He did. The simple statement "The flesh is useless, the spirit
gives life; the words I give you are spirit and life'" epitomizes the drastic
revamping and revitalization that human-meaning underwent. Such is the
basic structural balance required of human beings. Indeed, only when
truthfully (spiritually) ordered, personally and communally, can these es-
sentially blended, existentially compromised (corporeally subverted)
agents see the other truths following therefrom, as necessary for real and
responsible freedom. Only if activated dynamically can they realize their
sacred dignity.
THE AMERICAN DECLARATION'S DISTORTED DYNAMICS
Measured against the foregoing natural psychological and supernatu-
IS John 14:6.
1" See John 10:10. Christ said: "I have come that they may have life, and have it more
abundantly." Id.
'5 Matthew 6:13.
'e 1 T. AQUINAS, supra note 12, at Q77, art. 2.
" Matthew 4:17.
" John 6:4.
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ral theological standards, the American Declaration displays a serious de-
fect in its conclusory emphasis on fundamental human rights. While the
stated right to life correctly respects human nature's ultimate purpose or
end, and the asserted right to "pursuit of happiness" respects implicitly
human nature's overall procedural demands or methods, it is submitted
that the alleged right to liberty, presumably providing the dynamic link
between the other two, is radically deficient. It concentrates upon
humans' affective or volitional faculty, ignoring the vitally necessary,
prior guiding, cognitive counterpart. The latter's crucial truthful contri-
bution thus becomes superseded by the former's desiring trait. Under this
psychological approach, power accordingly prevails over light, with sub-
jectively slanted preferences proportionately, if often subconsciously,
dominating objectively founded references. That really represents the
meaning of ideological independence, as mainly a self-contrived and con-
cerned pseudo-scientific/societal attitude. 19 Such a compromised personal
condition manifests the more basic fallacy of misplaced concreteness, ac-
tually exalting emotion over thought, matter over mind, or body over
spirit. The said inverted psychical state exists, even though disguised
along artfully and articulately rationalized, pseudo-sophisticated lines.2 0
Those somewhat specific, supposedly enlightened, individualistically
inclined, arbitrary human adjustments are aggravated further, from a
critical Christian viewpoint, through the more general political context in
which they appear. The Declaration states ". . . to secure these Rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from
the Consent of the Governed .... "I" The largely individualistic, pro-
nouncedly subjectivistic, personal interpretation of the Declaration thus
is extended to society's organized public sector. Civil government conse-
quently not only bows before the citizenry as a whole, but concentrates
chiefly upon satisfying their claimed rights. As a result prior duties get no
notice and hence assume merely ancillary status as relatively unavoidable
necessities. This additional inverted arrangement reflects the aforemen-
tioned radical enshrining of liberty, without the required restraining truth
ensuring responsibility. Publicly and privately, then, attention primarily
if implicitly focuses on aggressive self-assertion.2 2
'" See W. BLUHM, IDEOLOGIES AND ATTITUDES: MODERN POLmCAL CULTURE 42 (1974).
20 Id.
" See The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
" See W. BLUHM, supra note 19, at 38-46. The political ideology at the time of the revolu-
tion was a radically different view of the role of the government than had existed in past
eras. The prevailing view from the days of Constantine and the Roman Empire through the
Middle Ages in the Western World was epitomized by a unity of church and state. Man's
"ecclesiastical and civil order were seen as simply two facets of the life of a single commu-
nity." Id. at 40. John Locke was a proponent of the modern political ideology upon which
our founding fathers based their view that church and state should be separate and distinct.
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Similarly, since the stated "consent of the governed" stands unquali-
fied, the evident implicit bent toward the individual's exaltation becomes
correspondingly reinforced by such explicit respect for absolute collective
autonomy. Truth accordingly has no more relevance in guiding or control-
ling power at the ultimately unified, theoretical political level than at the
comparatively diversified, proximate practical one. A majority's view re-
garding its rights', security, and the government's "just powers" to pro-
mote the same, would automatically determine the latter's validity. Popu-
larity and plausibility therefore are equivalent.23
Apologists may argue, as John C. Murray does, that the bare state-
ment: "We hold these Truths, ' 24 of the American Declaration, intrinsi-
cally ensures truth a proper preeminence throughout the succeeding affir-
mations. 26 Simply asserting concern for the truth, however, is far removed
from the full reality. The tragic content of human history, besides each
person's own living experience (when forthrightly faced), clearly confirms
this fundamental fact. If ensuing expressions do not remain consistent
with the initial claim, actually bearing contrary witness instead, or a seri-
ously compromised kind anyway, the promising introduction will not
cover the failure. As already observed, the Declaration's personal princi-
ples, which Murray says supply reasonable guiding light to the human
will's powerful desire, display serious substantive defects. Although evinc-
ing some objective accuracy or truthfulness, closer concentrated consider-
ations show strongly subjective inclinations, and thus a covertly material-
istic outlook on human nature. Such an adverse interpretation,
formulated along Christian critical lines, gains further credence when the
said political document's additional explanatory pronouncements are ana-
Id. at 44-45. The Declaration of Independence, it is submitted, clearly incorporates this new
political ideology. See id. at 38-46; M. ADLER & W. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 37-41; F. DONO-
VAN, supra note 4, at 133-50. As Locke himself wrote:
I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil
government from that of religion, and to settle the just bounds that lie between the
one and the other ...
The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the
procuring, preserving, and advancing of their own civil interests.
Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the posses-
sion of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.
J. LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 17 (2d ed. New York 1955); see also C. Ros-
SITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 375-78 (1953) ("Men like Hamilton and Jefferson might
have wished to ignore or at least neutralize the hand of God. ... ).
23 See W. BLUHM, supra note 19, at 72 (citing Jefferson's approval); see also J.C. MURRAY,
supra note 5, at 34-35 ("People who are called upon to obey have the right first to be heard.
... Through . . . majority opinion this popular judgment becomes binding on
government.").
24 The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
25 J.C. MURRAY, supra note 5, at 32.
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lyzed adequately.
Prefacing the Declaration's affirmation of the aforesaid Rights is a
statement regarding their source. "When in the Course of human Events,
it becomes necessary for one People . . . to assume the Powers of the
Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God entitle them ... ."I' That simplistic insight into the basic
human condition, more or less equivalently correlating the latter, earthly
Power, Nature, and God, really bespeaks an allegedly advanced, scientific
attitude (Enlightenment). So linking those cosmic forces manifests a
mainly mechanical, physical, vital conception concerning the world and
its contents. God, known solely, if at all, through a role as abstract creator
behind the material mechanism, has merely a distant, apparently disin-
terested connection therewith. The system largely remains self-operative,
controlled by divinely implanted dynamic influences."
Humanity, being one type among these earthly Powers albeit having
reason and choice, exercises a certain dominion over itself and other
types. Though under some elementary constraints inherited from Nature,
humans possess extensive capacities for self-development. They are actu-
alized through rational analysis and free expression, severally and jointly.
The group, diversely constituted but principally political or public, facili-
tates the members' advancement chiefly by laws consonant with general
agreement regarding humanity's status as an earthly Power. Such laws
entail officially accepted discoveries presumably promoting the citizens'
best interests and permitting the most diversity possible while still main-
taining a basic unity. Pluralism consequently prevails, meaning that the
truth is what functionally fits the fundamental framework rationally con-
ceived. The latter supposedly represents Nature's intrinsic impulsions to
attain the ends of the principally physical-psychical life empowering
human beings.28
This rationalized human conception, and the so-called natural laws,
positing rights inherently marking it, reflects a decidedly secularized ver-
sion as assayed against an earlier religious related tradition. Independent
minded, autonomously activated, "Enlightened" philosophers reformu-
lated the teaching during the 18th and 19th centuries. John Locke, par-
ticularly in society's political sector, exhibits the resultant subjective or
ideological revisionary impact very prominently. Ignoring the ancient
' The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
• See C. FRIEDRICH & R. McCLOSKEY, FROM THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE TO THE
CONSTrrUTION XXXVIII (1954); C. RossrrER, supra note 22, at 363-66.
" See W. BLUHM, supra note 19, at 52-54. (both the system of checks and balances on the
Constitution were means of limiting federal power and keeping religion out of politics); see
also C. RoSSITER, supra note 22, at 130-47 (science, independence, liberty and virtue fos-
tered by Colonial America as going hand in hand with happiness).
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Greek and Roman interpretations, Locke and his like concentrated
strictly upon later acclaimed sensible-empirical sources. However, they
asserted even though conveniently retaining, albeit radically revising, cru-
cial Christian notions which aided their energetic emancipating efforts. "'
Thus, an original pristine "state of nature" for humans was postu-
lated as providing elementary perfecting patterns guiding the develop-
ment of humanity. Similarly, such truly objective or spiritual human
qualities that these reformers attributed to the said "natural" condi-
tion-reason, choice, sociability, perfectability-actually constituted a
traditional inheritance. As previously understood, however, those per-
sonal assets comprised essential substantive components characterizing a
distinct human nature; which when viewed ontologically, objectively, or
metaphysically, as opposed to physiologically or subjectively, project sen-
sibly subverted conceptions. These had been sharpened and expanded
considerably through original Christianity's supernaturally enlightening
influence. Locke and his extremely independent, modernistic or pseudo-
scientific revisionists secularized or naturalized the entire range of human
values, by arbitrarily (autonomously) separating the supernatural and
natural vital orders' import. In doing this, he really, as ideologically, ex-
tended the earlier, allegedly religious reformers' artificial purifying
effects.30
Ideological Independence in the American Constitution
From the foregoing observations we see that the attitude toward nat-
ural law prevailing among American leaders at the time the Declaration
was written, largely evinced a modernistic secularistic interpretation re-
flecting supposed scientific enlightenment. Although ostensibly admitting
a divine source, the connections and ensuing relations affecting humans
were believed to be determined rationally, naturally, and independently
as regards religio-moral implications. Rational reflection obviously is es-
sential when discerning natural law, however proper emphasis must be
placed on discovering prior given obligations or duties basically guiding
and guarding the human. If the mere analytic approach and similar self-
centered ways emphasizing subsequent relevant rights instead are
adopted in America, the resulting determinations are seriously deformed.
Desire for liberty tends more and more toward controlling interest in
truth. Affective pragmatism artfully rationalized accordingly becomes the
hallmark of law, as a superficial positivism, whether traditional or
liberal.3
" See W. BLUHM, supra note 19, at 38-46; C. RossrrER, supra note 22, at 362-70.
80 See W. BLUHM, supra note 19, at 38-46; C. FREDRICH & R. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 27, at
XXXIX; C. ROSSITER, supra note 22, at 363-70.
"' See C. RoSSITER, supra note 22, at 366-67, 369. While Jefferson and Adams conceded the
existence of God, both asserted that God had no control over the acts of man. Id. at 366-67.
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The American Constitution, supposedly undergirding the Nation's
"rule of law," further confirms the ideologically independent outlook
manifested by the Declaration. While the Constitution presumably repre-
sents the Declaration's fuller elucidation, no specific link between them
clearly appears. Constitutional amendments comprising the "Bill of
Rights" do so rather vicariously. Neither there, nor anywhere else
throughout the second document however, do we find any reference to the
said rights' source-"their Creator," or "the laws of Nature and Nature's
God," as the first statement affirms. It may be asserted that the preamble
to the Constitution implicitly includes such recognition. It states:
We the People ... in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice,
insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our pos-
terity, do ordain and establish this Constitution...
These announced purposes certainly reflect natural principles of po-
litical life. They also require extensive complicated development, if the
elementary ends envisioned actually would be attained. Omitting overt
religious acknowledgements here, at least approximating the Declara-
tion's kind, strongly suggests the secularized, rationalized practical atti-
tude. Typifying the autonomously enlightened approach, the Framers evi-
dently considered each person's own experiences and insights adequate
for the task faced, provided they acted concertedly or democratically.
Rousseau's naturalistic religious view thus is implied-"[t]he voice of the
people is the voice of God. '38 As representing their continental constitu-
ents, the Framers expressed this voice initially. Although displaying the
two contrasting pragmatic predilections mentioned above, traditionalistic
and liberalistic, adherents of both sides agreed on the need to limit
sharply ensuing governmental powers. Imbued with pronouncedly dis-
trustful notions regarding rulers, they forged a fairly detailed definitive
document that closely restricts and regulates public authority. That con-
tribution toward the protection and promotion of individual rights,
through jointly devised and applied processes, produced the
Constitution.u
The American Constitution's ideologically independent import is suc-
cinctly expressed by Jefferson:
These rationalists contended that the laws of nature controlled the actions of men. Id. at
367; see also R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 252 (1977) (Founding Fathers were deeply committed to positivism).
3, U.S. CONST. preamble.
W. BLUHM, supra note 19, at 72.
See J. FRIEDRICH & I MCCLOSKEY, supra note 27, at X-XII; C. RossrrER, supra note 22,
at 374.
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It is jealousy and not confidence which prescribes limited constitutions to
bind down those whom we are obliged to trust with power . . . . In ques-
tions of power, then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind
him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution."
Interpreted objectively, or measured against standards recognizing human
beings' dependent creaturely status, we have the Enlightenment's self-as-
serted emancipation affirmed here. Radically autonomous, chiefly self-
concerned individuals, circumstantially compelled to combine under a
common authority for the mutual tangible realization of their respective
rights, begrudgingly do so only as far as such subjection cannot be
avoided. Predominantly private competing powers accept public counter-
parts, if the latter are limited strictly by the former's controlling direc-
tives. A typical rationally contrived, pragmatically projected societal rela-
tionship consequently exists. Constitutional principles, devised by
designated men acting on behalf of public constituencies, and aiming to
establish a central governing agency, somehow attain a reliability which
overcomes an innate human weakness when exercising public power. If
there can be no "confidence in man in questions of power," what can re-
ally surmount this want while constitutional framers act? Only intensely
subjective faith in the extravagantly self-confident composers could possi-
bly do so. We find the fallacy of misplaced concreteness manifested in the
belief that political "slight of mind" represents rationalization par excel-
lence, or pseudo-sophisticated Enlightenment, or that it reflects the
"truth" stemming from extreme emphasis on liberty as an unqualified
right-a "truth" mainly derived subjectively-corporeally rather than ob-
jectively-spiritually.
The fundamental governmental framework accordingly outlined ar-
ticulates a modern political development concerned largely with democ-
racy. Though the practice reaches far back into human history, its later
stages are properly pertinent for our purposes. Since the present analysis
follows a critical Christian approach, medieval constitutional traits down
to contemporary ones principally apply. Obviously, the study's necessary
limitations likewise permit merely a summarized overview. As indicated
earlier, Christian conceptions regarding human nature decisively fostered
improved attitudes toward natural law, and its impact on those personal
beings. While Revelation does not touch natural law directly, it does so
indirectly, clarifying and completing the latter's import. Such benefits re-
sult from Christ's original teachings and their continuing extensions or
elucidations through His Church's authoritative teaching.
Lacking a living reference to revealed truth, humans' innately im-
35 R. BERGER, supra note 31, at 252 (quoting 4 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 543 (1888)).
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paired rational faculties cannot maintain a correct balance between the
subjective and objective aspects thereof. An inherited urge toward self-
preservation and satisfaction usually outweighs other obligations involv-
ing self-denial. Concentrating on duties (and beyond) chiefly distin-
guishes communally or spiritually committed persons from independently
or corporeally inclined individuals. Christ implied this when warning,
"the man who tries to save his life shall lose it, it is the man who loses his
life . . . [for the truth] that will secure it".3 6 Conversely, Locke, with his
self-centered, secularly inspired, pseudo-idealists (really clever, covert
pragmatists), makes self-preservation and satisfaction the prime human
rule.
Christ established the Church to translate the supernaturally enlight-
ening personal norms that He initially promulgated into more compre-
hensive societal or organized communal terms. Under His persistent liv-
ing influence, it steadily developed truthful moral standards (natural and
supernatural) for public as well as private guidance when exercising lib-
erty. After the latter's due regulatory role was diminished by indepen-
dently impelled, self-righteous, would-be reformers, individualistic incli-
nations (always precariously restrained) also went beyond their proper
proportionate bounds, in both public and private life. From that point,
attention has focused increasingly on an ever fascinating freedom, di-
vorced from nearly all but subjectively, mainly sensibly, hence corpore-
ally, contrived controls. Publicly cloaked beneath popular "professional"
plausibility, pseudo-sophisticated, supposedly objective, secularized spiri-
tual rationalizations have gained widespread acceptance. Exalting rights
and excusing duties principally characterizes that modern libertarian atti-
tude. The American constitutional Framers, largely trapped through an
ideological impulsion toward naturalistic "Enlightenment," at least im-
plicitly evidenced such an exaggerated conception of personal
autonomy.37
Ideological Independence in American Law
As indicated previously, a pragmatic positivism prominently marked
the early American political approach, despite some seemingly idealistic
connections. Giving merely marginal, more mechanical than meaningful,
consideration to natural law in the Declaration of Independence, the
Signers manifested a simple, fundamental moral outlook. This obviously
3 Matthew 16:25.
31 See W. BLUHM, supra note 19, at 34-36. Traditionally the Church has exerted great power
over society. Id. at 35. During the Middle Ages however, the development of a constitution-
alist tradition limited the exercise of priestly authority. Id. at 35-36; see also C. FRIEDRICH,
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 10 (2d ed. 1946)(disappearance of universal
church as counterbalance to national monarchies was important factor in rise of
constitutionalism).
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suited the immediate purpose of the document: justifying the colonies'
revolt against England before the world. However, an extremely prag-
matic practical potential attended the said elemental theoretical position.
It became activated when the Constitution's Framers adopted a still sim-
pler variation on the same ultimately ingratiating theme, for their im-
mensely expanded political involvements. Concerned with formulating a
national governmental structure, the so burdened second group did not
explicitly bother about ideal guiding references. Rather they did what the
Declaration's moral fundamentalism demanded. They unconsciously fol-
lowed the basic law of logic that the greater an idea's extensiveness, the
less its corresponding comprehensiveness.
Viewing the natural moral law most simply, if at all, hence most
widely and easily applicable, the Framers accepted it as covering almost
anything intended by them. Accordingly, liberty's aggressive proponents
exerted exorbitant influence and pressed truth's cognitive insights along
individually preferred practical lines. The resulting affectively authorita-
tive assertions were roundly rationalized whether as "higher natural" law
or lower positive law, depending on the personal position. From the fore-
going analysis, it is apparent that only minimal deference was paid to-
ward natural law, other than as founding rights among the constitutional
Delegates. The vast majority or consensus evidently emphasized a deci-
sively pragmatic positive approach. However, prominent and pertinent
political differences did exist regarding the document's ensuing legal ef-
fects. These represented two principal contrasting interpretations of con-
stitutional positivism. They had emerged briefly earlier as traditional and
liberal.
The traditional or strongly conservative attitude especially stressed
the rights of the minority and their protection. Apparently exemplified
and largely led by John Adams, this group insisted on a consistent con-
formity with the Constitution's relatively literal legal requirements. Such
a sharply restricted regulatory role seemingly reflected profoundly pessi-
mistic notions concerning human nature. Restraining the majority was
held to provide the best ways and means which would ensure public or-
der. The traditionalism inherent there involved a somewhat extreme rev-
erence for constitutional provisions as originally given. 8
's W. BLUHM, supra note 19, at 71-73. Fearing the exploitation of both the rich and poor in
a democratic government, John Adams stated:
In every society where property exists, there will be a struggle between rich and poor.
Mixed in one equal assembly, equal laws can never be expected. They will either be
made by numbers, to plunder the few who are rich or by influence, to fleece the many
who are poor.
Id. at 71 (quoting J. ADAMS, A Defense of the American Constitution, in THE PoLMcAL
WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 158 (6 Peck Jr., ed. 1954)).
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While likewise manifesting a positive approach toward the funda-
mental, constitutional law, the liberal group linked the latter and the ma-
jority's position. They consequently held that interpretations and appli-
cations should be less strictly limited to represent more exactly prevailing
public preferences. Jefferson reportedly exerted a leading influence here,
deriving inspiration from his rather optimistic naturalistic impressions of
human nature. Resembling Rousseau, he said,
We may consider each generation as a distinct nation, with a right, by the
will of its majority, to bind themselves, but none to bind the succeeding
generations ....
Tbe idea that institutions established for the use of the nation cannot
be touched or modified. . . may perhaps be a salutory provision against the
abuses of a monarch, but is most absurd against the nation itself.39
The posivitism of Jefferson permits this substantive flexibility, as long as
it remains basically consistent with the Constitution.
Those two contrasting constitutional views actually depict the com-
parable elemental societal forces, personal and communal, jointly com-
prising the common good. Promoting a proper balance between them
poses the crucial governmental problem. Such systematizing efforts really
reflect, on the societal or organic human communal level, the critical chal-
lenge constantly confronting each individual member at the vital personal
level. It ultimately entails correctly consolidating the relatively competing
dynamic exigencies channelled through the two essential constitutional
components for human nature-corporeal and spiritual.40 Traditional
natural law recognizes and respects rudimentary structural order that is
especially characteristic of human beings. The said recognition and at-
tendant exposition includes the latter's extension from the simpler per-
sonal-individual plane to the complex communal-societal one. However,
when lacking additional supernatural enlightenment supplied by the true
Christian revelation, as authoritatively explicated by the officially com-
missioned Church, these fundamentally decisive formal connections are
not clearly ascertained, much less concertedly or aptly applied." Main-
taining this central substantive synthesis is difficult enough in humans'
personal-individual sector. The task becomes immensely increased under
organized communal or societal conditions and, without a basic balance,
39 Id. at 72 (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY 15-16 (S. PADOvER, ed. 1939)) (letter
to J.W. Epps, 1814 and letter to Governor Plummer, 1816).
" See J. MARrrAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD, ch. III-IV, 33 (1947) ("Our whole
being is an individual by reason of that in us which derives from matter and... that in us
which derives from spirit").
" Matthew 5:17 ("I have not come to set [the natural laws] aside, but to bring them to
perfection"); John 14:12 ("the man who has learned to believe in me will be able to do what
I do; nay, he will be able to do greater things yet").
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the fallacy of misplaced concreteness inevitably ensues.
As official interpreters of the law, the judiciary provides fuller in-
sights concerning its meaning or intent. The Supreme Court's decisions
interpreting the impact of the American Constitution on public and pri-
vate relationships accordingly reflects the theoretical and practical import
of primordial national law. We find the foregoing two contrasting consti-
tutional approaches-traditionalistic, personal-individual, and liberalistic,
communal-societal-alternately emphasized by the Court. Berger notes
some early cases showing loose, abstract references to natural law, like
Calder v. Bull and Fletcher v. Peck.4' Berger also cites evidence indicat-
ing how the above cases represented exceptional judicial stands.4 The
more regular, albeit not more exact, uses apparently occurred during the
Court's developing preference for protecting individual rights in property.
Berger reports them as beginning around 1897, when the case of Allgeyer
v. Louisiana4 4 was decided. The decision exhibited the traditionalistic
view regarding the positivistic legal significance of the Constitution."
Mentioning "John Adams'deep-seated conviction that 'property is as sa-
cred as the laws of God,'"46 Berger adds, "[h]istory reveals that property
actually was more highly prized by the Founders than 'civil liberties.'
This oblique excursus from "natural law," implicit in the Founders'
constitutional provisions, became a fixation with the Court throughout
the next several decades. Subsequently, however, the latter took an oppo-
site tack, manifesting a liberal attitude. The case of Gitlow v. New York'4
decided in 1925, started a more socially oriented trend. Civil liberties, like
"freedom of speech and of the press" began receiving principal protec-
tion. 49 Additionally, the Court facilitated legislation exerting broader con-
trol over economic relations.5 0 In the 1950's, the Court again emphasized
42 See R. BERGER, supra note 31, at 251, 253 (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386
(1798); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810)); see also C. HAINEs, THE RRWVAL OF
NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 90-91 (1930) (general principle of natural law justifies imposition of
law even on deity) (citing Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 143).
13 See R. BERGER, supra note 31, at 251-54; see also C. HAINES, supra note 42, at 56-59, 64-
72 (American courts accepted natural law principles in public law of United States although
rejected in Europe).
4" 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
45 Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 588-91 (fourteenth amendment's "liberty" right to pursue any call-
ing or trade is inalienable right and privilege of United States citizens).
46 R. BERGER, supra note 31, at 267.
17 Id. at 266.
48 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
49 R. BERGER, supra note 31, at 270.
"0 See NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43-45 (1937) (upholding right
of employees to freely form unions); see also A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 34 & n.n.1-35 (1976).
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individual rights.5 1 This latest traditionalistic tendency has steadily in-
creased, strengthened especially through emphasis on privacy as a new
individual right.52 Although these judicial variations are somewhat justifi-
able, considering human nature's normal pattern of compromising from
moderate to extreme inclinations, the result is compromised or temporal-
izing rationalizations. Therefore, the question is "has the Court swung
around the circle back to the method which led to equating Due Process
with the economics of laissez-faire[?]"5 1
The answer that the present study suggests is, yes. Furthermore, we
may confidently expect another swing toward excessive societal assertive-
ness at a later date. Those radical reactions follow from the pseudo-scien-
tific, naturalistically enlightened, secular subjectivism or individualism
mainly marring juristic thought today, in the same way as it did among
the Constitution's Framers. This unfortunate, formal fact has been con-
firmed in certain informal judicial explanatory statements. Justice
Holmes' famous dictum represents a near-perfect example: "[tihe life of
the law has not been logic: it has been experience. ' 54 Holmes' statement
neatly summarizes "main-line" American juridical thinking. Lacking the
logic of objective truth, other than proximate, pragmatic precedents,
judges interpret immediate experiences and problems facing them accord-
ing to their independent estimate concerning what the people want. Jus-
tice Harlan stated that "the very breadth and generality of the [Four-
teenth] Amendment's provision[s] suggests that its authors ...
[supposed] that the increasing experience and evolving conscience of the
American people would add new [meanings]." ' 5 Both Justices Brandeis
and Cardozo relied on "'the traditions and conscience of our people'. "5
Justice Frankfurter saw the Due Process Clause as "[e]ssentially inviting
a psychological judgment that reflects deep, even if inarticulate, feelings
of our society. '57
Professor Cahill provides a succinct overall summary when he says:
Modern legal theory looks to the consequences of its activities rather than
to the source of its authority or to any general principle to which it must
refer its decisions....
6' See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also A. Cox, supra note 50, at 57-
58. Cox described the Brown case as a "revolution in constitutional law" that led the Court
to take further action to protect the rights of individuals. Id.
" See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (penumbra of first amend-
ment protects privacy from governmental intrusion).
" See Cox supra note 50, at 54.
OW. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
" Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 175 (1968).
R. BERGER, supra note 31, at 275.
"" Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 603 (1948).
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It is in these terms law becomes an instrument of social ends.68
Thus does the dialectic between the Constitution's Framers' traditional
conservatism and liberalism, emphases upon a secularized, naturalistically
enlightened, abstract liberty, guided simply by subjectively pragmatic in-
terpretation of its relation to abstract rights, persistently plague us. With-
out a realistically rational "trialectic"15 9-tempering contrasting personal
and communal concerns by ultimately assaying them against an objec-
tively guiding natural law, the legal "pendulum" will surely swing wider
and wilder. Such a regressive political situation will reflect the fact that
an underlying fallacy of misplaced concreteness-subverting spiritual to
corporeal values-has correspondingly increased.
This ideological independence, bereft of all but elemental philosophi-
cal-natural, much more theological-supernatural, truth, bedecked with
myriad supplemental material or technical trimmings, necessarily, logi-
cally, and experimentally, produces a paramount political and general so-
cietal pluralism. It is the old law, logical and ontological, the less the com-
prehensiveness, the greater the extensiveness, or the "melting pot"
approach, done ever more expertly or "scientifically." Unless we are to be
led astray through an exorbitant enthusiasm for the alleged attendant
benefits claimed by both conservative and liberal proponents, we must
recall Christ's naturally and supernaturally truthful moral warning:
Enter through the narrow gate. The gate that leads to destruction is wide,
the road is clear, and many choose to follow it. But how narrow is the gate
that leads to life, how rough the road, and how few there are who find it.'0
- F. CAHILL, JR., JUDICIAL LEGISLATION: A STUDY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 151-52 (1952).
o' See supra text accompanying notes 11-19.
'o Matthew 7:13-14.
